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Abstract
It is argued that propositions cannot be the compositional semantic values of sen-
tences (in context) simply due to issues stemming from the compositional semantics of
modal operators (or modal quantifiers). In particular, the fact that the arguments for
double indexing generalize to multiple indexing exposes a fundamental tension in the
default philosophical conception of semantic theory. This provides further motivation
for making a distinction between two sentential semantic contents—what Dummett
(1973) called “ingredient sense” and “assertoric content”.
1 Semantic values and propositions
The following is a common view in the philosophy of language: A semantics for natural
language systematically pairs sentences with propositions in accord with the principle of
compositionality. This association of propositions with sentences must be given relative
to a context of utterance due to the context-sensitivity of language. The propositions that
sentences express relative to a context are: (i) the things we assert and communicate, (ii) the
things we believe and know, (iii) the bearers of truth, (iv) the referents of ‘that’-clauses, and
(v) the compositional semantic values of sentences (in context). (For recent endorsements
of this common view see King (2003) and Cappelen and Hawthorne (2009).)
Consider role (v) (and to some extent role (iv)). It is commonly thought that propositions
are the arguments to sentential operators.1 For example, in the sentence
∗For helpful discussion of the ideas in this paper many thanks to David Chalmers, Andy Egan, Daniel
Nolan, Jonathan Schaffer, Wolfgang Schwarz, and Clas Weber.
1The claim that propositions are the compositional semantic values of a sentences (in context) is so ortho-
dox that it is hardly ever explicitly defended. For explicit endorsement see King (2003), p. 206: “...sentences
can be assigned semantic values relative to contexts in such a way that propositions are compositionally as-
signed to sentences relative to context and are the semantic values relative to those contexts of the sentences
in question. And we need not assign sentences any second sort of semantic value.”; and see Cappelen and
Hawthorne (2009), p. 1: “The semantic values of declarative sentences relative to contexts of utterance are
propositions.”
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(1) It is necessary that kangaroos have tails.
the necessity operator takes the proposition expressed by ‘Kangaroos have tails’ as argument
and checks whether or not it is true in all accessible worlds. Likewise, it is commonly said
that propositional attitude reports relate an individual to a proposition. For example, the
sentence
(2) Olivia believes that kangaroos have tails.
says that Olivia stands in the believing relation to a certain proposition, namely the propo-
sition expressed by the embedded sentence ‘Kangaroos have tails’. The key idea is that
sentential operators such as ‘It is necessary that’ or ‘Olivia believes that’ operate on the
proposition expressed by their embedded sentence (in a context).
This common conception acknowledges the need to first resolve indexicality. For example,
consider the following sentence:
(3) It is necessary that I am here now.
In a context 〈w, t, a, l〉 the proposition expressed by ‘I am here now’ is the proposition that
a is at location l at time t. In the semantic evaluation of sentence (3) the necessity operator
takes this proposition as argument and checks its profile across modal space.
It is also acknowledged that the context must include a world parameter for the resolution
of modal indexicals such as ‘actual’. If we ignore the other parameters of context and focus
solely on the world parameter, then on the common view sentential truth is relativized to a
pair of worlds 〈w,w′〉. In this way, each sentence is associated with a function from world-
pairs to truth-values. The proposition expressed by a sentence in a context is what one gets
after supplying a contextual world (cf. Kaplan (1989a)). This is to say that the common
view accepts double indexing but identifies the proposition expressed by a sentence with the
set of worlds in which it is true relative to a context world.
My aim in this note is to argue that this common view is untenable. In particular, I
will argue that the compositional semantic value of a sentence (in context) cannot be a set
of worlds. There is a standard type of argument against this view: The so-called Operator
Arguments based on arguments in Kaplan (1989a) and Lewis (1980). These arguments
attempt to establish that sentential values in a context must be relativized to parameters
beyond possible worlds, e.g. times, locations, judges, etc. by focusing on the compositional
semantics of various non-modal intensional operators (e.g. temporal operators, locative
operators, agential operators etc.). The argument presented here is different: I will only
rely on issues stemming from the compositional semantics of modal operators (or modal
quantifiers).
The argument is simply this: the motivations for modal double indexing generalize to
modal multiple indexing. Thus, sentential semantic values (in context) must be sets of
infinite sequences of worlds. Sets of infinite sequences of worlds are not propositions. So, the
compositional semantic value of a sentence (in a context) is not a proposition. Admittedly,
the point is absolutely obvious once it is considered—but it needs to be said.
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2 Multiple indexing
Consider the following sentence:
(4) It is possible for everyone who actually survived the Titanic’s maiden voyage to have
died on the maiden voyage.
The correct representation of (4) requires the use of an ‘actuality’-operator (cf. Crossley and
Humberstone (1977)), since neither of the following logical forms quite capture its meaning
(where survive stands for ‘survived the Titanic’s maiden voyage’ and die stands for ‘died
on the Titanic’s maiden voyage’):
4a. ♦[∀x(survive(x) ⊃ die(x))]
4b. ∀x[survive(x) ⊃ ♦(die(x))]
Logical form (4a) simply states that there is a world where no one survives the Titanic’s
maiden voyage. So it says nothing about the fate of actual Titanic survivors in other worlds,
whereas (4) clearly does. Logical form (4b) does say something about the fate of actual
Titanic survivors in other worlds but it doesn’t say anything about their fate as a collective.
Notice that the truth of (4) requires that there be a world w where all the actual Titanic
survivors die in w together—logical form (4b) misses this. Whereas if we add the ‘actuality’-
operator ‘A’ to the syntax we have the resources to achieve the right result:
4c. ♦[∀x(A(survive(x)) ⊃ die(x))]
But, of course, the remedy isn’t just a matter of syntax. If sentential truth were only
relativized to a single world, one still couldn’t—given some standard assumptions—provide
the correct semantic representation of sentence (4). With a single world in the point of
reference JA(φ)Kw = 1 iff JφKw = 1. Thus there would be no semantic difference between
logical forms (4a) and (4c).2 For the ‘actuality’-operator to make any difference we must
relativize sentential truth to two worlds—that is to say that the correct representation of
sentence (4) requires a system of double indexing.
J(4c)Kw,w = 1
iff there is a world w′Rw such that J∀x(A(survive(x)) ⊃ die(x))Kw,w′ = 1
2J4cKw = 1 iff there is a world w′Rw such that J∀x[A(survive(x)) ⊃ die(x)]Kw′ = 1 iff there is a world
w′Rw such that for all x, either x doesn’t survive in w′ or x dies in w′.
3
iff there is a world w′Rw such that for all x, either x doesn’t survive in w or x
dies in w′.3,4
The fact that the semantics of indexicals embedded under intensional operators requires
double indexing was first pointed out by Kamp (1971) with regard to tense logic. Consider
the following sentence:
(5) Everyone now alive will be dead.
The logical form (or at least the metalanguage truth conditions) can be represented as such:
[∃t′ : t′ > t](∀x(alive(x, t) ⊃ dead(x, t′)))
And this requires two times in the point of reference (i.e. an assignment of times to two
distinct temporal variables). Vlach (1973) upped the ante by focusing on sentences such as
the “past tense” version of (5):
(6) Once everyone then alive would be dead.
We can represent the logical from of (6) as follows:
[∃t′ : t′ < t][∃t′′ : t′′ > t′](∀x(alive(x, t′) ⊃ dead(x, t′′)))
Given the three temporal variables in the syntax this requires three times in the point of
reference. With increasingly more complex sentences involving further temporal embedding
3For dialectical purposes I am intentionally ignoring the semantics of quantification over individuals and
the assignment function (i.e. the infinite sequence of individuals) required for the semantic evaluation of
free variables and variable binding. One might, however, argue that assignment-shifting devices of this
sort already provide an argument against the philosophically entrenched view of propositions (see Rabern
(2012)). Relatedly, one might already be suspect of the view that propositions are the arguments of sentential
operators given the phenomena of “quantifying in”. For example, consider sentences such as “Ralph believes
some man is a spy” (focus on the reading where the QNP takes wide scope: “Some man is such that
Ralph believes that he is a spy”), “Every prime number is such that necessarily it is greater than one”,
or “Every man believes that he is misunderstood”. The compositional semantic values of the embedded
sentences—containing bound pronouns—cannot be propositions. In this connection it is worth pointing out
that Kaplan (1989a) introduces and motivates direct reference theory by considering the following quantified
modal formula: ∃x(Fx ∧ ¬Fx). Kaplan states that in order to evaluate the truth-value of the component
formula ‘Fx’ (at an assignment) we must first determine what proposition is expressed by its component
formula ‘Fx’ (at an assignment) and then determine whether or not it is a necessary proposition. It is
interesting that Kaplan seems to be endorsing the thesis that propositions are the arguments to sentential
operators (e.g. ) with the type of “quantifying in” example that might be thought to expose its falsity.
(Thanks to Daniel Nolan and Jonathan Schaffer for helping me to make these connections.)
4I should also note that I am assuming a constant domain semantics to keep things simple. Moving to a
variable-domain semantics makes things more complicated and some subtle issues arise but it does not affect
the essential point that double indexing is required.
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there is a need for further temporal parameters.5 The upshot being that natural language
has the full expressive power of object language quantification over times such that points
of reference must include an infinite sequence of times (Cresswell (1990)).6
Let’s now set aside temporal constructions and focus only on world-shifting devices.
There is a completely analogous situation in the modal realm. Consider the following “coun-
terfactual version” of sentence (4).
(7) If the Titanic had not hit an iceberg on its maiden voyage, it would still have been
possible for everyone who would then have survived the maiden voyage to die on the
maiden voyage.7
Whereas sentence (4) required that sentential truth be relativized to two worlds, sentence
(7) requires that sentential truth be relativized to three worlds. Sentence (7) says that in the
closest worlds where the Titanic doesn’t hit an iceberg on its maiden voyage, the survivors
of that voyage are not essentially survivors. This cannot be captured by the following logical
form (where no-iceberg stands for the sentence ‘The Titanic did not hit an iceberg on its
maiden voyage’):
7a. no-iceberg @→ ♦[∀x(survive(x) ⊃ die(x))]
This simply says that in the closest worlds where the Titanic doesn’t hit an iceberg on its
maiden voyage, there is a world accessible from that world were there are survivors of the
Titanic’s maiden voyage. Thus it says nothing about the other-worldly fate of the survivors
in the closest no-iceberg worlds. More explicitly (7a) is true at w if and only if in all the
closest-to-w no-iceberg worlds w′, there is a world w′′ accessible from w′ such that for all
x, either x doesn’t survive in w′′ or x dies in w′′.
Whereas (7) instead looks to a close world where the Titanic doesn’t hit an iceberg, and
then says of the Titanic survivors in that world, that there is another world where they don’t
survive. So it says something about the other-worldly fate of the survivors in the closest
no-iceberg worlds. To put the point a different way, the consequent of the counterfactual
must back-reference the world introduced by the counterfactual. (This is analogously to the
way that ‘then’ back-references the time introduced by ‘Once’ in (6).) So sentence (7) is
true at w if and only if in all the closest-to-w no-iceberg worlds w′, there is a world w′′
5The appendix to Vlach (1973) briefly outlines the need to generalize to the infinite case (see pp. 183-185)
and Cresswell (1990) has a detailed and careful treatment of such a generalization for both the temporal and
modal case.
6Note that due to multiple indexing those who motivate temporalism about propositions via arguments
from temporal embedding must instead conclude that propositions are sets of tuples consisting of a world
followed by an infinite sequence of times, i.e. sets of pairs of the form 〈w, 〈t1, t2, t3, . . . 〉〉. Eternalists may
view this as a reductio of such arguments.
7I owe examples of this general form to Wolfgang Schwarz. It might sound more natural to consider this
dialogue concerning counterfactual histories of the Titanic: “A: Everyone who actually survived the Titanic’s
maiden voyage could have died on the maiden voyage. B: I agree. And even if the Titanic had not hit an
iceberg on its maiden voyage, it would still have been possible for everyone who would then have survived
the maiden voyage to die on the maiden voyage.”
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accessible from w′ such that for all x, either x doesn’t survive in w′ or x dies in w′′. Notice
that there are three worlds involved in the semantic evaluation of sentence (7).
With a few harmless assumptions we can get a different and more perspicuous view of
the situation. Assume that a counterfactual pφ @→ ψq is true at w if and only if for all the
closest-to-w φ-worlds w′, ψ is true at w′.8 Let’s abbreviate “the closest-to-w φ-worlds” as
C(φ,w) and let’s go ahead and use object language modal quantifiers and variables to rep-
resent the logical form of counterfactual sentences. We translate a counterfactual sentence
pφ @→ ψq into syntax using world variables and a restricted modal quantifier as follows:
[∀w′ : w′ ∈ C(φ,w)]ψ(w′)
Under these assumptions the correct logical form of (7) is as follows:
7b. [∀w′ : w′ ∈ C(no-iceberg, w)][∃w′′ : w′′Rw′](∀x(survive(x,w′) ⊃ die(x,w′′)))
Logical form (7b) contains three distinct world variables and thus the semantic evaluation
of (7b) requires three worlds in the point of reference.
We see that the argument for double world indexing generalizes to triple and quadruple,
and ultimately to infinite world indexing (see Cresswell (1990), pp. 34-46).9 Which is to say
that natural language has the full expressive power of object language quantification over
worlds such that points of reference must include an infinite sequence of worlds—a mere
doubly-indexed semantics (i.e. a semantics where sentential values are mere sets of worlds
relative to a context) is insufficient. This is to say that the compositional semantic value of
sentences (in context) must be sets of infinite sequences of worlds (or functions from infinite
sequences of worlds to truth-values).
3 Propositions under multiple indexing
The preceding section was a reminder.10 Multiple indexing is a fact that theorists generally
accept, e.g. Kratzer (2011) states:
[Cresswell (1990) has shewn] that natural languages have the full expressive power
of object language quantification over worlds and times. Quantification over
8Note that I’ve made certain simplifying assumptions about the semantics of counterfactual conditionals,
e.g. I’ve made the limit assumption, I’ve assumed that the quantification involved is “all” instead of “most”,
and I’ve assumed that the relevant accessibility relation is tightly constrained by the antecedent. But all
that matters for the argument I provided here is that the context world w is represented in the metalanguage
truth conditions. Any semantics that has the truth of φ @→ ψ at w depend on the truth of ψ at worlds
somehow related to w will share this essential feature.
9For a sentence requiring three worlds in the index Cresswell provides “If the economic climate had been
favorable it would have been desirable that some who are not actually rich but would have been rich be
poor” (p. 40). See Cresswell (1990) p. 40 sentence (36) for a sentence with four worlds in play.
10See Cresswell (1990), pp. 34-46; and see also Forbes (1989), chapters 1-2.
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worlds or times is thus no different from quantification over individuals, and
should be accounted for in the same way.11
But it hasn’t been emphasized that multiple indexing conflicts with the common view that
propositions are both the objects of assertion and the compositional semantic values of
sentences. If we make the plausible assumption that propositions are not sets of infinite
sequences of worlds, then it immediately follows that due to multiple indexing propositions
are not the compositional semantic values of sentences.12 One could, of course, apply modus
tollens but do we have any independent reason to think that the things we say and believe
are (or are best modeled by) sets of infinite sequences of worlds?
Theorists tend to focus on the case of double indexing. And this lines up well with
the Kaplanian distinction between content generating versus content evaluating parameters
(Kaplan (1989a)). But the motivations for this Kaplanian distinction are really quite different
from the motivations for double indexing from compositional semantics. And once we take
the latter motivations to their logical consequence we are left with a system of infinite
indexing, which doesn’t cohere nicely with Kaplan’s two-level picture. There is a fundamental
tension in our default philosophical conception of semantic theory.13
Yet, one might think that this discussion is misguided for the following reason: If modal
language is treated by means of object language quantification and variables, then the se-
mantics of modal constructions are handled by the assignment function (Schaffer (2012)).
And for this reason it might be thought that there is no threat to the idea that propositions
are semantic values. After all, if modal quantifiers present a problem for the common view,
then we already have the problem due to individual quantifiers and variables.
Indeed we do! Whether we call the parameters relative to which expressions have
extensions “the index” or “the assignment” makes no essential difference. For example,
with an “intensional” treatment of tense extensions are relative to an index 〈t1, t2, t3 . . . 〉,
whereas with an “extensional” treatment of tense extensions are relative to an assignment
〈t1, t2, t3 . . . 〉.14 It is simply a confusion to think that the semantics of object language quan-
tification is somehow of a different kind than the semantics of “intensional operators”. In an
11Kratzer (2011) sec. 5. See also Schlenker (2006) p. 509 and Schaffer (2012), sec. 2.
12If propositions are understood to be Russellian or structured (instead of simple sets of points of reference)
the conclusion still holds but it is not as straightforward. If Russellian propositions only determine a set
of worlds, then they are informationally insufficient. In addition to a world-neutral Russellian content the
semantics requires a “content-base” that is neutral with respect to an infinite sequence of worlds (this is
analogous to the situation with tense in the propositional semantics provided in Salmon (1986), pp. 143-151).
We must also bear in mind that providing a recursive pairing of Russellian propositions with sentences does
not actually provide a compositional semantics—its more akin to a translation into another language. To
complete the semantics one must provide a recursive definition of the truth-values of propositions relative to
points of reference.
13We can, of course, recover a set of worlds from a set of sequences of worlds by taking the diagonal. This,
however, does not retain the identification of compositional values with propositions, so it would be wrong
to insist that diagnolization saves the common view. Likewise, one could assign sentences sets of worlds and
give a non-compositional yet recursive account of modal operators. But I am working under the assumption
that the semantics for modal constructions is genuinely compositional.
14We could construe the assignment as a function from temporal variables to times instead of as a sequence
of times (to which the temporal variables are indexed). In this way there would be a (superficial) difference
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important sense it’s the same semantics just in a different syntactic package.15 This is why
I have been confidently jumping back and forth between intensionalist logical forms and ex-
tensionalist logical forms—the conclusion holds regardless of whether we adopt intensionalist
or extensionalist syntactic treatments.
No doubt there remains the schmentencite way out (Lewis (1980), pp. 32-33). The
schmentencite claims that sentences do not embed under modal operators/quantifiers. If
not, then the semantic values of sentences needn’t be multiply indexed. Yet non-sentential
expressions—schmentences—do embed under modal operators/quantifiers and the argu-
ments for multiple indexing will apply to their semantic values. The schmentencite might
as well have the semantic values of sentences be truth-values, since if the values of sentences
are never actually the input to compositionality it will be trivially true that they are the
values apt for compositional semantics. The schmentencite thesis is a syntactic one, and as
such I will leave it to future syntax theory.
The real lesson I think is a familiar yet underemphasized one: we must distinguish
between the compositional semantic value of a sentence (what Dummett called “ingredient
sense”) and the proposition expressed by a sentence in a context (what Dummett called
“assertoric content”).16 The argument from multiple indexing rests on premises that we all
generally accept, thus we can no longer turn a blind eye to this fundamental tension in the
default philosophical conception of semantic theory.
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